In a narrow sense, it decided that the decision to pay the tax bonus to eligible Australians earlier in the year was constitutional.
However, it is a decision that could have significant ramifications on the federal structure.
The Australian Parliament has increasingly appropriated money to directly fund projects and schemes using the so-called executive power of the Commonwealth without regard to whether the thing being funded is relevant to one of the areas for which the Commonwealth has constitutional responsibility.
This proposition did not receive total High Court support.
The general direction of the Court is contained in this paragraph of the joint judgement of Justices Hayne and Kiefel:
In the end the Commonwealth's submissions about the executive and incidental powers came down to the proposition that the Commonwealth's power to spend is limited only by the need to obtain parliamentary approval for the proposed expenditure. That contention should be rejected. The matters of historySadly, it will require more litigation to work out with greater certainty what is ‘good’ direct Commonwealth expenditure and what is ‘bad’ direct expenditure, although it would appear that things that are clearly Commonwealth responsibilities will still be okay.
described earlier in these reasons do not require its acceptance. Its acceptance would not be consistent with what Mason J referred to as "the broad division of responsibilities between the Commonwealth and the States achieved by the distribution of legislative powers" and would, by "enabling the Commonwealth to carry out within Australia programmes standing outside the acknowledged heads of legislative power merely because these programmes can be conveniently formulated and administered by the national government", effect a radical transformation in what has hitherto been thought to be the constitutional structure of the nation. To hold that the Commonwealth power to spend does not extend so far is consistent with what was decided in the Pharmaceutical Benefits Case and, after the AAP Case, in Davis v The Commonwealth.
Leaving aside the mechanism of section 96 tied grants, the States could be liable to fund a greater range of activities. Could they even if they wanted to? This is discussed in the next article.
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